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This paper studies the labour force participation dynamics of older couples in
the United States. Longitudinal data from the ﬁve available waves of the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) is used to investigate if the dynamics introduced
by considering both spouses’ behavior provide additional information in trying to
ﬁt observed participation sequences. The paper uses a bivariate dynamic binary
choice model with unobserved heterogeneity and serial correlation to disentan-
gle the many sources of dynamics and correlation in a couple’s decision making.
First, strong true state-dependence is found and results in a bunching of partic-
ipation and non-participation sequences. Cross-spouse state-dependence is also
found which points to indirect eﬀects of social security and pension incentives
through complementarity in leisure. Second, the Spouse Allowance program is
found to have predicted eﬀects on participation of the couple and these eﬀects are
statistically signiﬁcant. A simulation exercise presents evidence that the elimi-
nation of the spouse allowance can raise participation of wives at age 62 by more
than the decrease in participation of husbands at age 65.
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11 Introduction
It is often argued that the race will be between increasing participation of older couples
and the decreasing fertility trend in order to predict how large the ageing problem will
be in the coming years. Therefore, it follows that one cornerstone of an eﬃcient social
security system should be that it can adequately meet the needs of a new generation
of elderly, with greater labour market experience than preceding ones. Adding to this
policy relevance, the positive trend in labour force participation (LFP) of wives makes
the analysis of retirement outcomes of couples, as a generalization of the analysis of
”single individuals”, an important topic on the economic research agenda (Lumsdaine
and Mitchell, 1999). As a matter of fact, one can ﬁnd in features of the data that joint
retirement outcomes are relatively frequent (Hurd, 1990; Maestas, 2001; Gustman and
Steinmeier 2002) and conditional probabilities of participation are often very diﬀerent
depending on the lagged participation status of the spouse (Blau, 1997 and 1998).
Hence, this suggest that apparent coordination of retirement behavior among spouses
is an interesting of research topic both from a positive but also normative perspective.
Can it be useful to consider at all couples in the analysis of retirement decisions?1
Burtless (1990) rightly points out that as long as a spouse’s behavior aﬀects the behav-
ior of another spouse only by introducing some correlation in the unobservables, one
need not worry about the consistency of the inference if the investigator concentrates
only on single individuals. Indeed, recent studies show that ﬁnancial incentives have
a negligible direct eﬀect on the coordination of labour supply of older couples (Blau,
1997,1998; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000). Hence, the state of knowledge is that pref-
erences for shared leisure seems to be the most important source of this coordination.
For example, Blau’s studies point to indirect eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on labour
supply of the couple but do not indicate statistically that the spouse allowance, a spe-
cial feature of the American social security system, aﬀects labour supply of the couple
and particularly the joint retirement outcomes.2 While Gustman and Steinmeier con-
sider an uncertainty free environment for the couple, Blau uses a sophisticated dynamic
multinomial probit model for which the interpretation of the results is not straightfor-
ward and lacks standard errors to assess the precision of the estimates.3 In his 1998
paper using the Retirement History Survey (RHS) data from 1969-1979, Blau argues
that: “An important task for future research will be to determine if the patterns of
behavior documented in this article are still prevalent, or wether these patterns have
developed” (p.622).
In this paper, I revisit these issues using the most recent available data from the
1Although most authors in this literature interpret their ﬁndings in terms of retirement behavior,
the decision variable used in most cases is participation in the labor market. One should recognize
that retirement is an ambiguous concept since transitions out of retirement are observed frequently
(Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999).
2Under this program, a spouse is entitled to the maximum of her own beneﬁt and half the beneﬁt
of her spouse given that he is eligible for social security.
3Blau (1997,1998) models the four possible participation states that a couple can occupy allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity in each state and state-dependence. Estimation of the full model implies
nearly 500 parameters to estimate.
2Health and Retirement Study. In particular, I try to address potential shortcomings of
the approach taken in both Gustman and Steinmeier (2000,2002) and Blau (1997,1998)
by considering very general dynamics in the participation decision of couples using a
bivariate dynamic binary choice model with serially correlated errors and unobserved
heterogeneity. Since tractability is desirable, I do this by imposing some structure
that leaves a straightforward interpretation to the results and enables comparisons
with more restrictive models used in the literature (see Coile (2003) and Pozzebon and
Mitchell (1989) for example).
I ﬁnd that based on the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of the HRS, an elimination of the spouse
allowance could roughly decrease husbands’ participation rates by an average of 1.56
percentage points while it would increase the participation rate of wives by an average
of 3.6 percentage points. This points at an overall positive eﬀect of the elimination
of the spouse allowance on the participation of couples. Participation decisions are
found to depend on the past decisions of both spouses which leads to multiplier eﬀects
of social security and pensions. For a representative wife, the evidence suggest that
having a husband that worked in the previous year is associated with a 8.3 percentage
points increase in the probability of working compared to having a non-active husband.
Alternatively, the eﬀect found is estimated to be a 6.4 percentage points increase for the
wife’s lagged decision on the participation decision of the husband. Moreover, private
pension accruals are found to have a signiﬁcant impact of the participation of wives
(3.4 percentage point for 10% yearly accrual) while this eﬀect is smaller for husbands
(0.9%). On the methodological side, inferences from models are found to be biased
when leaving the dynamics aside. Particularly, the eﬀect of pensions is found to be
overestimated in static models and the correlation in unobserved heterogeneity among
spouses is imprecisely estimated upon considering cross-spouse state-dependence.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the ﬁndings on the diﬀerent
sources of coordination in labour supply of older couples. Section 3 looks at indicators
of labour supply dynamics in the ﬁve available waves of the Health and Retirement
Study. Following this, section 4 presents the eﬀect of introducing state-dependence in
a labour supply model for couples. In section 5, the empirical strategy is discussed. In
Section 6, I analyze the results and their implications. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Sources of Coordination in Labour Supply
Starting with Hurd’s (1990) study on the prevalence of joint retirement, a new line
of research has emerged trying to investigate the behavior of couples at the eve of
retirement.4 The main question is to ﬁnd out if coordination in labour supply originates
either from the observable preferences, from the ﬁnancial incentives aﬀecting the budget
constraint or from unobservables which are correlated among spouses.
4Although Pozzebon and Mitchell (1989) consider the eﬀect of the husband’s retirement status on
the wife’s retirement decision, the focus of their study is on retirement behavior of married women
which does not model the behavior of the husband. Jim´ enez et al. (1999) document the prevalence
of joint retirement in 12 European countries.
3On the incentive side, the spouse allowance has been the main candidate to ex-
plain coordination in retirement dates.5 Suppose the following common situation for
a ﬁctitious couple where John is 65 and Mary 62. John is entitled to a monthly ben-
eﬁt of 1000$ in a given month and suppose that Mary is entitled to a beneﬁt on her
own account of 300$. The spouse allowance allows Mary to collect half the beneﬁt of
John if this amount is higher than her own entitlement. In this case, the couple gets
1500$ in total. In the next year, the incentives to work will depend on the return that
both spouses can get from working. Indeed, if Mary’s wage (and increase in monthly
beneﬁt) does not bring her beneﬁt above the 500$ threshold there is no gain to reap
from her participation in terms of beneﬁts for the household. In this example, even the
average increase in beneﬁts of 7% due to the actuarial reduction factor will not bring
her beneﬁt to be the binding force.
However, suppose that John considers working an additional year. If he does so,
even if his wage does not increase his monthly beneﬁt, his beneﬁt will increase because
of the delayed retirement credit of roughly 7% in the actual system. As a consequence,
his beneﬁt will increase by 70$ per month while the total beneﬁt available to the couple
increases by 105$ per month. Hence, the incentive is to encourage work for the husband
and discourage work for the wife if the diﬀerence in beneﬁts is such that the owner of
the account is the one that increases total beneﬁt at the margin. However, note that if
John and Mary had the same beneﬁt entitlement of 650$ in a month, the couple would
get 1300$ instead of 1500$. Since earnings inequality is rewarded by such a program,
some have argued that the system should move to an income sharing rule (see Blau
1997 for a review of the arguments).
From a similar illustration, Blau (1997) concludes: “It is clear, therefore that mar-
ried women will supply less labour and their husbands will supply more labour in the
presence of a spouse beneﬁt provision than in its absence”(p.378). Surprisingly, when
looking at the data from the Retirement History Survey of 1969-1979, Blau ﬁnds a
relatively small positive eﬀect on participation for husbands and a negative eﬀect for
wives, although the statistical signiﬁcance of those eﬀects cannot be assessed because
of computational diﬃculties.
Thus, he concludes that the evidence suggest that “... equity issues should remain
the focus of the debate over the spouse beneﬁt...” (p.414) while in another paper in
1998 more evidence is found that “... these associations [in retirement dates] are not
explained by ﬁnancial incentives but seem instead to be a result of preferences for
shared leisure” (p.597).6
Revisiting his 1997 results, Blau (1998) ﬁnds that the dynamics in participation of
one spouse are important to explain transitions by the other spouse. Hence, he argues
that there are multiplier eﬀects or indirect eﬀects on participation that arise from
5See McCarthy (1990) and Vistnes (1994) for a discussion of the eﬀects of the spouse allowance.
6Baker (2002) ﬁnds that the introduction of the spouse beneﬁt in Canada had the predicted eﬀect
of increasing husband’s LFP compared to the going trend while wives did not share the rising trend in
participation of those not entitled to the beneﬁt. S´ edillot and Walraet (2002) ﬁnd that complemen-
tarity of leisure is prevalent but that large penalties for early retirement in the French social security
system appear to decrease its eﬀect.
4social security incentives but that the spouse allowance does not appear responsible for
the simultaneity in participation decisions. Quite plausibly, a potential explanation for
these dynamics is that couples prefer to spend time in the same state (complementarity
in leisure).
Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) follow a structural approach to investigate the
possibility that complementarity in leisure is an important determinant of joint retire-
ment. In a Nash-bargaining process with no uncertainty, the decision of one spouse
will depend on the other spouse’s decision through the utility function if the marginal
utility of leisure is a function of this decision. Nevertheless, upon parameterizing a
utility function, the only positive eﬀect found is that of the wife’s retirement status in
the husband’s utility function, which suggests that the complementarity component is
not important in the bargaining game. Conﬁrming previous studies’ results, they do
not ﬁnd evidence of ﬁnancial incentives eﬀects. However, they ﬁnd relatively impor-
tant correlation between spouse speciﬁc unobservables which are interpreted as a taste
for retirement.7 Therefore, when looking at potential explanations of joint retirement,
they conclude that “...the taste term plays a very large role in accounting for the large
share of ages at which various individuals retire”. Additionally, consistent with the
result of Blau, they conclude that “... joint retirement is due to preferences and not
to the budget set” (p.536). In a sense, the results of Gustman and Steinmeier (2000)
send the researchers in the ﬁeld to the initial dilemma of Burtless who argues that
one should not take into account the other spouse’s decision if this only introduces
correlation in unobservables.
In this paper, I argue that there are many reasons why it is important to revisit
these ﬁndings. The data used is generally old (from the 1969-89 period) and that in
the case of the Gustman and Steinmeier study only workers with important labour
force history are selected such that generalizations are diﬃcult to make about labour
supply of the elderly in general. Furthermore, their analysis is about retirement as an
absorbing state which fails to recognize that in recent years, dynamics out of retirement
are more common (Blau,1997).
Moreover, although Gustman and Steinmeier’s approach is structural, it suﬀers
from the fact that no uncertainty from the viewpoint of the couple is allowed for
in their model. It is assumed that is a one-shot decision made by the couple from
which deviations are not proﬁtable latter in life. The estimation problem boils down
to a cross-sectional problem but the inference of the eﬀect will not use time-varying
unobservables and observables. In this case, it may not be surprising to see few of the
covariates having an eﬀect on retirement outcomes. Moreover, there is a risk that the
unobserved heterogeneity correlation will incorporate the correlation in time-varying
shocks which has very diﬀerent implications for the dynamics if such dynamics are
present.
Furthermore, considering such Nash-bargaining models leads to the famous incom-
plete estimation problem with multiple equilibrium and for which only ad hoc solutions
7Christensen and Datta Gupta (1994) ﬁnd evidence of complementarity of leisure from such cor-
relation. Coile (2003) and Maestas (2001) ﬁnd evidence of this from subjective data on preference for
shared leisure which is associated with small diﬀerences in retirement years.
5exist (see Tamer (2002) for recent solutions in cross-sections). In Gustman and Stein-
meier’s papers this problem is “solved” by assuming that in case of a multiple solution,
the spouse who retires ﬁrst commits the other to its preferred equilibrium. If this
assumption is incorrect, it is likely to lead to inconsistent estimates.8
On the other hand, Blau’s multinomial probit model does not address directly the
return for the couple of the spouse allowance which translates into non-linear eﬀects of
beneﬁts of both spouses. In both 1997 and 1998 papers, the potential for serially corre-
lated errors is not addressed and the correlation between both spouse’s unobservables
cannot be easily derived for comparison with other results. Furthermore, because of
reported computational diﬃculties, standard errors are not reported which limits the
inference that can be done from the results. Therefore, the challenge is to impose
some plausible restrictions on Blau’s approach that will get rid of the computational
complexities without altering the generality of the conclusions. From a methodological
standpoint, it is also important that we understand what are the gains from ﬂexibility
in dynamics compared with static models.
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The Health and Retirement Study is a longitudinal survey of individuals aged 51-61 in
1992 in the United States. The project started in 1990 and was funded by the National
Institute on Aging and other partners such as the Social Security Administration. Data
was collected every two years and covers a wide range of aspects of the life of elderly
couples. For the ﬁrst wave of 1992, 12,652 interviews were performed from a random
sample of individuals born between 1931 and 1941 inclusively. The spouse of these
individuals was automatically included in the sample even in the case were he/she was
not eligible. This gives equally detailed information on both partners of a couple.
I use the public release from the RAND organization that merged records from the
5 available waves.9 Data is arranged by match (couples) consisting of a respondent
and his spouse. The matches are observed over 5 possible periods each covering two
years. Deleting observations with important missing information, I am left with 2,928
couples followed over ﬁve waves covering ten years (1990-2000).
An individual is deﬁned as employed (L) if he/she is working for pay at the time of
the interview and this includes those working full-time or part-time. In the sample, we
have that the employment rate is 77.4% (60.9%) for husbands (wives) in 1992. About
half of the couples enter the sample with both participating. The trend in employment
rate is negative as one would expect and employment rates fall to 49% (43.7%) in
2000 were the cohort followed is aged between 61 and 71. Finally, the diﬀerence in
employment rates gets smaller with time meaning that labour force attachment of
husbands falls more rapidly than that of wives over the period.
Table 1 presents biannual transition matrices for males with conditional proportion
8Maestas (2001) faces the same problem and assumes that only the wife’s participation decision
enters the husband’s decision.
9http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod/
6of those in a state staying or moving to another state. A far greater number of working
individuals continue to do so while a far greater number of individuals who are not
working stay in this state. This suggest that there is potentially state-dependence.
However, from this transition matrix one cannot see if this is due to the mover-stayer
eﬀect, the fact that individuals diﬀer intrinsically in their probability of moving there-
fore creating spurious dynamics due to selection, or if it is due to true state-dependence
such that something happens in a state that makes someone more likely to stay in this
state.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We can also look at the diﬀerent combinations of labour force participation over the
ﬁve waves. In table 2, such frequencies can be found for husbands and wives. There
is considerable inertia in the transitions to suggest that there is state-dependence.
Interestingly around one ﬁfth of all transitions for husbands and wives feature reverse
permanent ﬂows into participation (0xxx1 sequences).
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
One informative exercise is to look at the diﬀerence between the probability of
working for pay for one spouse conditional on the state that the other spouse occupied.
From table 3, we can see that the probability that a wife works is 20:3 percentage point
higher if the husband also worked in the previous period. This could be due to many
things, matching of taste for work (assortative mating), true state dependence, similar
characteristics, etc. For husbands, this diﬀerence is ﬁfteen percentage points which is
still relatively high. Finally, this eﬀect increases by six percentage points for husbands
over the ten year period while it increases by four percentage points for wives.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
If one looks at the joint transitions which are the primary object of analysis (table
4), then state-dependence appears the strongest when both spouses occupy the same
state which may be an indication of complementarity in leisure. It is also interesting to
note the important number of transitions out of non-participation which suggest that
an analysis considering retirement as an absorbing state misses important information
on the interactions between spouses.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
From these observations, it is apparent that an adequate model should account for
the grouping of participation decisions across time. Moreover, it should answer why
there is a dependence of a spouse’s decision on the previous decision of the other spouse
and ﬁnally, why couples prefer to occupy the same state and make transitions in the
same time interval.
74 State-Dependence in a Labour Supply Model
The purpose of this section is to study how reservation wages are aﬀected by the
state in which the couple is at the time of their decision. Traditionally, in a unitary
framework, resources of the household are pooled and the optimal outcome is the one
that maximizes an intertemporal household utility function. Assuming intertemporal
separability of the utility function and exponential discounting, the expected present





where u is the subperiod utility and xt+s 2 RK is the period t + s characteris-
tics of the household. The controls are C; pooled consumption, and h = (hm;hf)0 2
f0;1g £ f0;1g are the participation controls for the spouses which are assumed dis-
crete.10 Finally, the discount rate is 0 · Ã < 1 and Et is the conditional expectation
over the uncertainty space in xt+s (s = 0;:::;1) using information up to t.
A dependence of the participation decision of a spouse on the decision this same
spouse took in the preceding period can be motivated by a search process for unem-
ployed spouses (Hyslop, 1999), involving increasing costs with age. Indeed, this could
be a consequence of labour market rigidities at older age (Hurd, 1996). On the one
hand, Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) document the possible labour market rigidities
that may exist on the old age segment of the labour market. One such indication that
they report is that approximately 12-15% of workers feel they are discriminated against
because of their age according to the ﬁrst wave of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS).
On the other hand, there are other ways by which the functioning of the market
and institutions that aﬀect it can reduce mobility and ﬂexibility for older workers.
These ways are surveyed by Hurd (1996). Among them is job-speciﬁc human capital
investment which would induce ﬁrms to prefer younger workers because the returns to
investment in their human-capital can be obtained over a longer period. Furthermore,
since economic sectors evolve through time, human capital investments that were made
in a period when they were valuable may not be valued anymore as new technologies
replace others.11 As a consequence, these factors motivate the possibility that rigidi-
ties can create state-dependence which may be severe for older workers. One way to
parameterize these rigidities is to write the budget constraint for period t as12
Ct = yt + w
0
tht ¡ °
0 [(¶ ¡ ht¡1) ± ht] (2)
where wt is the wage vector in period t and ° = (°m;°f)0 2 R2
++ is the vector that
captures the search cost associated with participating in the labour market in case the
10The subscript m refers to the husband and f to the wife.
11Another rigidity often mentioned is hours constraints. The fact that workers seldom go back to
work in the same industry following a quit from a long-term job could also be suggestive of hours
constraints if they are constant across industries because of team-work arrangements or other synergy
mechanisms.
12Assuming away savings simpliﬁes the exposition but results would remain qualitatively the same.
8spouse did not participate in the previous period. Finally, ± is the element-by-element
product and ¶ is a unit vector. Occupying the state of non-participation does not imply
that a spouse is consuming resources to search. This is particularly realistic for this age
segment where non-participation is more likely to be retirement than unemployment.
Therefore, the costs of search are absorbed by the couple upon accepting to participate
which is more in-line with the stylized facts that feature diﬃculties for the elderly to
re-enter the labour market. Hence, the analysis will diﬀer from that of Hyslop (1999)
who explicitly tying search costs to the state of non-participation irrespective of the
decision made by the spouses.
If wages and non-labour income are both from stationary processes, the value func-
tion for period t’s decision is given by V (ht¡1) = maxs fV s(ht¡1)g where s is a com-
bination from f0;1g £ f0;1g. Each alternative’s value function (suppressing xt for
simplicity and the reference to time) is given by
V
s(ht¡1) = u(y + w
0s ¡ °
0 [(¶ ¡ ht¡1) ± s];s) + ÃV (s): (3)
First, we can deﬁne reservation wages for both spouses holding the other spouse
out of the labour force,
w
m
0 (ht¡1) : V
10(ht¡1jw
m









The subscript denotes the state of the other spouse on which the reservation wage
is conditioned. I proceed in a similar fashion to Hyslop (1999) to show how reservation
wages are aﬀected by the state occupied by the couple. Taking ﬁrst the outcome where




0 (ht¡1)) ¡ V
10(0jw
m
0 (0)) = V
00(ht¡1) ¡ V
00(0) (5)
holds as a result of (4). In addition, note that V 00(ht¡1) = V 00(0) since the value
of not-participating is not aﬀected by the choice that the couple made in the previous
period (search cost are absorbed only by non-participants entering the labour market):
As a result, (5) involves the equality
u(y + w
m
0 (ht¡1) ¡ °m(1 ¡ hmt¡1);1;0) (6)
= u(y + w
m
0 (0) ¡ °m;1;0)
which immediately yields the desired equivalence between the two reservation wages,
w
m
0 (ht¡1) = w
m
0 (0) ¡ °mhmt¡1: (7)





0;01(0) ¡ °fhft¡1: (8)
9The reservation wage of the wife holding the husband out of the labour force will
not depend on his lagged decision because there will be no income eﬀect arising from
his search costs. Her search costs will be entirely absorbed in the wage asked to make
her indiﬀerent between participating and not participating. The unambiguous eﬀect
of search costs in these two cases will be to increase the participation probability of
a spouse, holding the other not participating, if that spouse did work in the previous
period.
Alternatively, if one considers the reservation wages of both spouse holding the

































u(y + wm ¡ °m(1 ¡ hmt¡1);1;0) ¡ u(y + wm ¡ °m;1;0) (11)










Using ﬁrst-order Taylor expansions (for small search costs) on the L.H.S around
y + wm and around y + wm + w
f



















°m is the relative marginal utility loss to
the couple of search cost holding the other spouse participating.13
Holding the wife participating, the approximation of the husband’s reservation wage



















There are three eﬀects on reservation wages of lagged participation of the spouse
which are apparent in °¤
f and °¤
f:
First there is an negative income eﬀect if the utility function is concave and wm
1 (0;wf)
is strictly positive. This eﬀect tend to suggest that a spouse’s lagged decision should
13uC() is the marginal utility of consumption.
10have a negative eﬀect on participation. This eﬀect will increase if the is high risk aver-
sion or if wm
1 (0;wf) is high. Second, if leisure is a normal good ( @w
f
1(0;wf)=@wf > 0)
the market wage obtained by the other spouse will have yet another negative income
eﬀect on the gains from lagged participation for the other spouse. It will lower (in
absolute terms) the relative marginal utility loss of search costs to the one spouse
holding the other spouse participating. Third, if uC(C;1;1) > uC(C;0;1) for a given
level of consumption, there is a positive relative marginal utility loss to the working
couple from not participating in the previous period. The magnitude of this eﬀect will
depend on the nature of the goods consumed (public vs private) and the actual degree
of complementarity in leisure of both spouse.
Wether wm
1 (ht¡1;wf) or wm
0 (ht¡1) (similarly for the wife) is relevant in for a par-
ticular decision is endogenously determined and depends on the form of the utility
function. Note that only wm
1 (ht¡1;wf) depends on the lagged participation decision
of the other spouse while both reservation wages depend on the lagged participation
decision of the spouse in the same way. Complementarity in leisure would tend to
make wm
1 (ht¡1;wf) lower than wm
0 (ht¡1) but again there are income eﬀects that do
not enable to conclude on the relevant reservation wage for the decision of the spouse.
This will depend among other things on the degree of complementarity in leisure, the
curvature of the utility function, the market wage of the other spouse and the lagged
participation status of that spouse.
The model generates two predictions with respect to the eﬀect of search costs. First,
from estimates of a participation equation of a spouse with lagged participation of both
spouses, the predicted eﬀect of that spouse’s lagged participation is anticipated to be
positive because of search costs. Second, the other spouse’s lagged participation will
tell, based on the model just developed, if the income eﬀects or substitution eﬀect dom-
inate. In the later case, the eﬀect will be positive, a spouse’s participation probability
will raise if the other spouse worked in the preceding period. In fact, the sign of the
estimated cross-spouse state-dependence “identiﬁes” if there is suﬃcient “complemen-
tarity” in the couple’s decision making to overturn the income eﬀects. From table 3,
a ﬁrst indication is that the complementarity eﬀect appears to dominate. Naturally,
a more in-dept analysis is needed since assortative mating is clearly an alternative
explanation for this observed behavior.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Econometric Model
For each couple i, I observe in the HRS data a sequence fhmit;hfit;xmit;xfit;zmi;zfig
T
t=1
of labour force participation h and some strictly exogenous variation (from labor force
participation) in attributes of the choice environment x varying over time and z some
time-invariant attributes of the couple. I want to model the probability of observing
the sequence fhmit;hfitg
T
t=1 for household i given these attributes. Drawing on the the-
oretical model of the previous section, a natural candidate is the following latent data
generating process which represents the excess utility from labour force participation














fi°f + hmit¡1'fm + hfit¡1'ff + ´fit:
Finally, the observation rule is given by ¿(h¤
jit) = 1[0;1)(h¤
jit) for j = m;f. In a
random eﬀect setting, where ´jit = ¹ji + "jit, the identifying assumption is that ¹ji,
the spouse speciﬁc unobservable (to the econometrician) should be independent of the
regressors in vectors xjit;zji. Yet, the assumption is particularly doubtful for social
security incentives. Indeed, it is likely that spouses with high unobserved labour force
attachment will also have better beneﬁt prospects which would lead to an upward bias
on the eﬀect of this variable. One way to control for this possibility is to resort to
correlated random eﬀects (Chamberlain, 1984). Speciﬁcally, I will assume a ﬂexible
form ¹ji =
PT
s=1 ±jswjis + ®ji where ±js are parameters to estimate and wjis are the
wages of both spouses.
Turning now to dynamics in unobservables, a ﬂexible conﬁguration is allowed. Par-
ticularly, the spouse speciﬁc unobservables ®i = (®mi;®fi)0 are assumed independently
distributed over couples with variances ¾2
®j and correlation coeﬃcient ½®: Moreover, the
transitory errors "it = ("mit;"fit)0 are assumed to follow a stationary diagonal VAR(1)
process with AR coeﬃcients ½"j and ﬁnally, innovations vit = (vmit;vfit)0 are assumed
distributed independently over couples according to a bivariate normal distribution
with variances ¾2
vj and correlation ½v.
The lagged endogenous variable, although pre-determined, is present on the right
hand side of both spouses’ equations. It is by construction correlated with the spouse
unobservables (both because of heterogeneity and serial correlation) ,therefore, leading
to inconsistent estimates if this correlation is not properly taken into account. Hence,
I use Heckman’s (1981) approximation to partially take account of the problem by
approximating the probability at period 1 which seems to work well in simulations
(Chay and Hyslop, 2000). Parameters are allowed to be diﬀerent in the ﬁrst period
and errors are freely correlated with other period’s errors. In short, the interpretation
is that this ﬁrst probability is a reduced form solution where lagged participation has
been recursively substituted out.14
To summarize and relate to the discussion in the literature, there are two types of
correlation between the spouses’ labour supply apart from the initial condition correla-
tions and their main purpose is to separate the time-varying and time-invariant eﬀects
in the correlation found in Gustman and Steinmeier (2000). On the one hand, the
permanent component correlation, ½®; which takes account of assortative mating. For
instance, people with similar tastes for work may naturally match together or poten-
tially there is a division of labour within the household which aﬀects their reservation
wage. One should note that the strict exogeneity of beneﬁts (assuming the correct func-
tional form) can be tested using H0 : ±s = 0 for s = 1;::;T. On the other hand, there
14Results for initial condition are not reported in the tables but can be provided by the author upon
request. Although the magnitude of the parameters is diﬀerent the signs of the eﬀects do not change
compared with the main equation’s results. See Appendix A for details.
12is another correlation allowed for transitory errors ½v. Plausibly, unforeseen events
that occur in time may well be correlated among spouses, for example because both
spouses share a similar living environment. Since it is the correlation in decisions in a
given time period, positively correlated unexplained variability of their decisions can
be an indication of the degree of complementarity in leisure of the utility function.
Finally, the diagonal vector auto-regressive structure in the transitory errors allows for
a lasting eﬀect of correlated transitory errors over time. Hence, serial correlation, un-
observed heterogeneity and state-dependence all may contribute together to explaining
the dynamics found in labour force participation of couples.
For identiﬁcation of this binary choice model, some normalization is imposed on
the covariance matrix. This is discussed along with the derivation of the likelihood
contributions in appendix A. To a large extent these are the same as those imposed
in Hyslop (1999) for the univariate case. Based on the distributional assumptions,
the likelihood contribution of couple i is the probability that the sequence of labour
force participation is observed conditional on the strictly exogenous regressors and a
parameter vector grouping all parameters to be estimated. This probability consists of
a ten dimensional integral which is simulated using the GHK (Geweke, Hassivassiliou
and Keane: see Hajivassiliou et al. 1997) probability simulator. In this respect, I make
use of pseudo-random draws from the uniform distribution and I use Halton sequences
which have good coverage and variance-reduction properties (Train, 2002).
6 Speciﬁcation and Results
6.1 Speciﬁcation
Standard demographic variables such as age of both spouse, schooling and race are
included in the speciﬁcation. Furthermore, I include the number of marriages the
individual had to proxy cohesion between spouses as this may be a function of the
time they have been together. Two measures of health are included. The “activities of
daily living index” (ADL index) is the sum of 0-1 answers to questions about diﬀerent
diﬃculties to perform such tasks as to cook, dress, bathe, walk around the room and
to get out of the bed. It is used to capture the eﬀect of long-term physical diﬃculties.
The health index ranges from one to ﬁve, ﬁve indicating that the respondent evaluates
that he is in poor health. In addition, I also include the other spouse’s health status
into the speciﬁcation to capture caring activities which may take away available time
to work for the spouse. Both spouses’ lags are also included in the speciﬁcation for
dynamic models to allow for long lasting eﬀects of health changes (Smith, 1999).
Turning now to ﬁnancial variables, pension accruals are deﬁned as the percentage
diﬀerence between the expected present value of pension wealth at the given ages.
These present values are based on scenario one of the work of Peticolas and Steinmeier
(1999) which uses plausible assumptions about interest rate and inﬂation rate. They
use the data from the Employer Pension Study conducted by the HRS in 1992. This
data is merged to the RAND ﬁles on couples. Since pensions are calculated every
ﬁve years, only two such accruals are considered, one from 55 to 60 year old and
13one from 60 to 65. I acknowledge that this aggregation may be missing some of the
important nonlinearities in incentives. Once an individual reaches the upper bound
of the age group, the accrual is set to zero. Moreover, individuals without pension
plans are assigned a value of zero for these accruals. To summarize, one can interpret
the accruals as an incentive to work if they are positive and since they are set to
zero once the individual reaches the upper age bound the eﬀect can be interpreted
as a forward looking eﬀect of pension accruals. In addition, the household capital
income is included to measure the eﬀect on participation of non-labour income but
also potentially captures any responsiveness to the change in capital income due to
ﬁnancial market ﬂuctuations.
Since I do not have access to restricted data portion of the HRS containing the
main element of the old age insurance, the average indexed monthly wage, I resort to
an approximation of this quantity by using the average of the wages of a spouse. This
may be a correct measure if spouses do not reduce hours at the intensive margin when
approaching retirement and if their wages do not increase or decrease signiﬁcantly as
they approach retirement. They are based on the imputed wage correcting for sample
selection. Yet, the corrections are not used in the ﬁnal imputation to avoid simul-
taneity bias. The details of the imputation process which takes account of selection
in unobservables to retrieve population parameters using Vella and Verbeek’s (1999)
two-step estimator are found in appendix B along with the details of the computation
of social security beneﬁts.
One of the primary interests of the present investigation is to capture potential
spouse allowance incentives. A wife (husband) is entitled to half her(his) husbands’
(wife’s) entitlement if that amount is larger than her (his) own entitlement, condi-
tional on her (him) being eligible. One way to construct a measure of this incen-
tive is to compute the immediate return to the total beneﬁt of the couple from the
spouse allowance as a percentage of total household social security income, smit =
1(0;1)(0:5bmt¡bft)
0:5bmt¡bft
1:5bmt and similarly for the spouse allowance available to the hus-
band where bmt and bft are the imputed beneﬁt entitlement of each spouse in period
t. This kind of non-linearities in the incentives and the way they evolve in time could
explain why just including both spouses’ beneﬁts is not suﬃcient to capture the eﬀect
of the spouse beneﬁt. We can still use this measure to capture a forward looking aspect
if the wife (husband) is not eligible at t. For instance, I then replace bft by the beneﬁt
the wife would get at 62. Hence, identiﬁcation comes from institutional variation in
the age path of beneﬁt plus the variation across couples in wage potential diﬀerences
since the correlated random eﬀects speciﬁcation controls for the cross-section variation
in wages.
6.2 Results
I proceed in the following way to assess the eﬀect of introducing dynamics and cor-
relation in the labour supply behavior of older couples. First, I report static probit
estimates for each spouse imposing the correlation to be zero between equations. This
mimics the strategy used by Coile (2003) to assess the eﬀect of social security on the be-
14havior of couples although I consider unobserved heterogeneity as an additional source
of variation in the unexplained part of the error term. Then I introduce correlation
among decisions both in permanent unobserved heterogeneity and in the transitory
errors without introducing other dynamics. This mimics in a reduced-form way the
analysis done by Gustman and Steinmeier (2000,2002) since the dependence of each
spouse’s decision on the decision of the other will be found in the correlation in tran-
sitory unobserved errors while there will also be correlation in preferences which they
interpret as taste for work. This should not change the parameter estimates but could
potentially result in eﬃciency gains.
The third set of estimates will investigate dynamics introduced by state-dependence
(SD hereafter) in each spouse’s equation separately without allowing for correlation
among spouses. This will be close to the work of Hyslop (1999) for participation of
younger married women from the PSID. After assessing its possible impact on the
estimates, I will then allow in a last set of estimates the decisions to be correlated
and allow for cross-spouse SD as presented in the model of section 5. Note that all
three previous set of estimates are nested in this last model such that likelihood ratio
tests can be used to test them against the more general counterparts. These estimates
along with the marginal eﬀects for both bivariate models are reported in table 6 and
7. Moreover, I will perform a goodness-of-ﬁt exercise to compare the performance of
the static and dynamic bivariate probit.
Inasmuch as wage imputation is used in the same way for all model, let us ﬁrst
look at the results. From table B.1 in the appendix the joint hypothesis of no sample
selection is rejected for both spouse. Both Gustman and Steinmeier (2000,2002) and
Blau (1997,1998) do not take account of selection in their imputation techniques. The
results show that selection is found to come primarily from person-speciﬁc characteris-
tics which also illustrates that the simple Heckman procedure (selecting on time-variant
unobservables) is not enough in this longitudinal data setting.15
6.2.1 Static Univariate Probit Model Estimates
Coile (2003) considers a model of spouse behavior where both equations are indepen-
dent of each other (no correlation in unobservables) and where no dynamics are allowed
for (state-dependence or serial autocorrelation). The assumptions in the general model
are therefore that the correlation parameters are set to zero and that neither lagged
dependent variables nor serial correlation are present in the process. The ﬁrst two
columns of table 5 report the results for the speciﬁcation mentioned in the previous
section using the static univariate probits.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Once can see that the share of unobserved heterogeneity is estimated to represent
3/4 of the total variance in the error component. This share is estimated to be sta-
tistically higher for wives than for husbands. Note that the correlated random eﬀect
15Estimating cross-sectional sample selection models will capture selection in both unobservables
but will not be able to disentangle them. Furthermore, this technique is likely to be less eﬃcient.
15speciﬁcation is used in this set of estimates and that the restrictions are easily rejected
(H0 : ±s = 0 s = 1;:::;T). Not surprisingly, the eﬀect of age is to decrease participation
as one would expect and as found in the descriptive analysis. Moreover, the husband’s
participation rate falls faster than the wife’s participation rate controlling for cohort
eﬀects (which do not seem to be present constrained in a linear form). The age of the
spouse controlling for own age has the unambiguous eﬀect of decreasing participation
rates. Another interesting result is that individuals who have been married many times
tend to participate less than those who have been married only once.
As found in other studies, health deterioration is one of the primary factors aﬀecting
participation at advanced age. Both measures, ADL and self-reported health status
show signiﬁcant eﬀects. Particularly, the addition of one diﬃculty in performing daily
living tasks is estimated to have nearly twice the eﬀect that an additional year of age
has. This eﬀect is smaller (1-year) for the self-reported health status although it is
diﬃcult to compare the two measures since they are scale-dependent. The eﬀect of a
change in the ADL index has a bigger impact for wives than for husbands (not shared
for subjective health) while wives tend to respond marginally to a deterioration of the
subjective health of their husband by increasing participation (only signiﬁcant at 10%).
Coming now to the incentive variables linked to retirement, a ﬁrst interesting el-
ement is the gender diﬀerence in the eﬀect of private pension accruals. As expected,
positive accruals give incentives to stay longer in the labour market and they are most
predominant in the 55-60 window (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1998). Wives tend to re-
spond more than husbands to these incentives and this result was also found by Blau
(1997).
Finally, beneﬁts from the spouse allowance on the husband’s account appear to
give a disincentive for the wife to work as predicted by Blau (1997). This eﬀect is
about twice as large as the eﬀect of age for a 10% increase in the spouse allowance.
No positive incentive eﬀect is found for the husband and no eﬀect is found for couples
entitled under the wife’s social security account.
6.2.2 Static Bivariate Probit Model Estimates
The likelihood ratio test for the restrictions imposed in the separate probits of the
previous section rejects these at the 1% level (LR = 175.7;Â2
(2);0:01 = 9:21). Nonetheless,
under the random eﬀect assumption these restrictions should not bias the parameter
estimates. Indeed, this is exactly the result that underlined Burtless’ comment on the
usefulness of considering couples. As a matter of fact, estimates in the second and
third column of table 5 show that no eﬃciency gains are realized and that parameter
estimates remain virtually the same.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The additional information that we get is that there is both correlation in the deci-
sions of each spouse because of similar taste for work and because otherwise unexplained
variation in their decisions seems to be correlated, indicating a form of complementar-
ity in leisure since these cannot be due to beneﬁt incentives. Note that the result on
16the correlation in taste for work is roughly the same as that found in Gustman and
Steinmeier (2000,2002). Yet, if the exercise stopped there we would conclude that pref-
erences appear to matter enough for cohesion and that incentives aﬀect each spouse’s
behavior.
6.2.3 Dynamic Univariate Probit Estimates
Along with introducing dynamics in participation we also introduce lags of subjective
health status. Therefore, the static and dynamic models are not directly comparable
because simultaneous changes are made to the speciﬁcation. The resulting likelihood
ratio test statistics reject for both spouses the restrictions imposed by the static probit
and the restrictive dynamics in health.
More importantly, the results reported in columns 5 and 6 of table 5 also show
that the apparently high share of unobserved heterogeneity was in fact due to state-
dependence (SD). Indeed, the share of unobserved heterogeneity drops by more than
2/3 compared to the static probit estimates. Hence, the results suggest that SD is
the primary determinant of participation for both spouses. In fact, this is in-line with
the general belief that there are costs to transition, that render retirement, consecutive
periods of non-participation, as an optimal behavior for most individuals. These results
conﬁrm is that non-participation is not only due to incentives (shifts in the budget set
which yield corner solutions) and to preferences (shifts in the indiﬀerence curve with
age) but also to adjustment costs in the form of rigidities (Blau, 1998).
Looking at the last dynamic component of the model, the AR(1) parameters are
found to be negative for both spouse which is indicative of misspeciﬁcation of the
dynamics. Since the time span is short, I do not have many degrees of freedom to
alter the dynamics by including more lags of participation. It is interesting to note
that this result is very similar to that found by Hyslop (1999) for younger wives using
the PSID.16 More importantly, neglecting the AR(1) structure does not change results
for the conditional mean function of both equations but increases marginally the share
of unobserved heterogeneity which is mirrored in the opposite direction for the SD
parameters.
Comparing with results from the static models (both bivariate and univariate), the
marriage eﬀect and racial eﬀect disappear for husbands while the racial eﬀect remains
for wives. This result indicates diﬀerent participation behavior among non-white wives
at older age. The age eﬀect decreases for both spouses after the introduction of dy-
namics which could be interpreted as a sign that there are increasing adjustment costs
with age. However, the interaction term of the participation status with age are both
insigniﬁcant. Since dynamics in health have been included, the accumulated eﬀect of a
health shock on participation probabilities was potentially captured by the age eﬀect.
Although there does not appear to be any dynamic eﬀect on participation from
16The initial correlations are also very similar to those of Hyslop (1999). I tried experimenting
with the dynamics in health to see if this could be the cause. The results were still negative for the
serial correlation. Estimation AR(1) linear probability models also reveals negative serial-correlation.
These results can be provided upon request.
17changes in the ADL index, the eﬀect is now much stronger than in the static case
(relative to the age eﬀect) which could be could expected since lagged participation
is negatively correlated with changes in the ADL index. Dynamic eﬀects are found
for subjective health status with the cumulative eﬀect being similar now to the eﬀect
of a one-time change in the ADL index. Long-term changes in the subjective health
status are likely to be positively correlated with increasing diﬃculty to perform daily
living activities which are usually indications or long-term mobility and health prob-
lems. The income eﬀect for wives associated with a deterioration of their husband’s
subjective health status remains and increases upon considering participation dynam-
ics. As always, the causal interpretation of the correlation between health changes and
transitions should be made with extreme caution (Smith, 1999).
The eﬀect of pension accruals from 55 to 60 years old decreases substantially as a
ratio of the age eﬀect. As marginal eﬀects in table 6 shows, the eﬀect for wives goes
from 1.02 to 0.69 year equivalent with a similar decrease for husbands for a one percent
change in the accrual. It is important to note that the gender diﬀerence remains after
allowing for dynamics. This is similar to results found in Blau (1997).
Important negative participation eﬀects from the spouse allowance are found from
these estimates for the receiving spouses. From these estimates, it is clear that the
spouse allowance on the husband’s account has a net negative participation eﬀect at
the level of the couple. Since no eﬀect is found for wives on their own account, there is
again a net negative eﬀect on the participation of the couple from the spouse allowance.
The next step is to introduce correlation in the decisions and further allow par-
ticipation decisions of each spouse to depend on past decisions of the other spouse as
suggested by the ﬁgures in table 3 and see if these modify the eﬀects found in the
univariate dynamic case.
6.2.4 Bivariate Dynamic Probit Model Estimates
Since the univariate dynamic models are nested in the bivariate dynamic model it is
ﬁrst interesting to assess the statistical validity of the restrictions by a likelihood ratio
test. Such a test yields a value of 169.8 (Â2
(5);0:95 = 11:07) which leads clearly to the
rejection of those restrictions.
The age eﬀect corresponds to the observed decline in participation rates observed
in the data. From 50 to 65, the predicted decline in participation for males is 30%
which is roughly the observed decline (from 77% to 49%). Similar ﬁgures are obtained
for wives.
Comparing the dynamic features of the present model with the previous set of
estimates using the last two columns of table 5, we see that the SD parameters do not
change signiﬁcantly for husbands while the wife’s state-dependence parameter increases
considerably. In addition, the share of unobserved heterogeneity in the total variance
remains constant for both spouses. The AR(1) parameter estimates mimic those in the
univariate case and the initial condition estimates are similar. Finally, the SD eﬀects
are considerable with husband and wives having roughly 62% higher participation
probabilities if they were participating in the previous period (Table 6). Adjustment
18cost appear to be important enough so that a marginal change in the wage and therefore
beneﬁt can have a substantial long-term eﬀect on participation if many couples are near
the extensive margin of participation.
The cross-spouse eﬀects are found to be statistically signiﬁcant while moderate in
the case of the eﬀect of the wife’s state on the participation propensity of the husband
(p-value 6.3% for the wife’s eﬀect on the husband’s probability). Moreover, the gender
asymmetry is statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, ﬁnancial incentives such as private
pension can trigger indirect eﬀects on the participation of the other spouse who is found
to be 6.4 percentage point for the wife’s eﬀect on the husband (and 8.3 percentage point
for husband’s on the wife). Figure 1 presents the result of a simulation exercise where
these cross-SD parameters have been restricted to zero (not re-estimated).
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Neglecting cross-SD shifts upward transition rates out of the labour force for both
husbands and wives as can be seen in the top panel. Interestingly, transition rates into
the labour force in the lower panel do not change signiﬁcantly for husbands while they
decrease for wives suggesting that the aggregate eﬀect of cross-spouse state-dependence
is stronger for wives than husbands for re-entering the labour market. Although it is
very tempting to identify this eﬀect as a sign of complementarity in leisure, it cannot
be undoubtedly disentangled from other possible eﬀects. These results are consistent
with the substitution eﬀect dominating both income eﬀects in the model developed
in section 4. A structural analysis under such a rich error structure being nearly
impossible it is perhaps best to use this as additional evidence of complementarity in
leisure in addition to the statistically signiﬁcant correlation in unobserved transitory
errors. The correlation between the two unexplained transitory errors in the decision
of spouses is estimated to be 0.16. However, the results suggest that upon taking into
account cross-state dependence, the apparent latent correlation in attitude towards
the labour market (taste-for-work as Gustman and Steinmeier called it) is imprecisely
estimated. Hence, this result illustrates that it is important to identify the source of
this correlation since both do not lead to the same conclusions.
For a 50% negative accrual over 5 years from private pensions (10% per year), the
model estimates suggest that participation probabilities in a given period are reduced
by 3.4 percentage points for wives while the eﬀect is only 0.9 percentage points for
husbands. Interestingly, accumulated over the ﬁve year term of such an accrual this
ﬁgure is important. However, the fact that we imperfectly measure the accrual at 5 year
intervals limits the extrapolation of the long term eﬀect of the incentive. Since there
are indirect eﬀects, early retirement incentives can trigger retirement of one spouse
and weaken the labour force attachment of the other spouse. Hence, the generosity
of private pension plans can have multiplier eﬀects which are interesting to consider if
the goal of policymakers is to increase total participation of the couple.
Losing the ability to perform an activity of daily living yields on average a 4.9 (6.2)
percentage point decline in the participation probability of husbands (wives). Similarly,
important negative eﬀects arise from a deterioration of one’s subjective health status
and appear to have long-lasting additional eﬀects for husbands while this lagged eﬀect
19is not found for wives. When considering dynamics, the long-term eﬀect of a one-time
change in health status is estimated to be 5.0 and 4.9 percentage points for husbands
and wives respectively compared to 3.2 and 2.5 percentage point for contemporaneous
impacts. Finally, the cross-spouse income eﬀect is moderate for wife and result in
an estimated one percentage point increase in their probability of participation for a
deterioration in subjective health status of their husband.
Husbands’ are found to have a positive incentive to work when their wife is entitled
to the spouse allowance on their account. Although this eﬀect is important it does not
balance out the negative eﬀect on participation of the wife. Therefore there is a net
negative participation eﬀect of the spouse allowance on participation of the couple.From
a policy perspective, the spouse allowance eﬀects are not negligible and are statistically
signiﬁcant although they oﬀset partially each other in the case of the husband’s account.
Therefore, it is not clear if the spouse allowance results in lower aggregate participation
at the couple’s level. As a matter of fact, without exogenous variation in the spouse
beneﬁt it is diﬃcult to predicts the eﬀect of potential reforms. In Figure 2, a simulation
exercise is performed where spouse allowance parameters are set to zero and compared
with baseline predicted and observed transition rates.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Compared to baseline hazard rates out of the labour force, the spouse allowance
appears to a positive incentive for husbands at precisely age 64 while it gives a negative
incentive for wives at age 62 which is roughly reﬂection the average age diﬀerence being
1.7 years in the sample. This is indirect evidence that the spouse allowance can be
part of the explanation for joint transitions out of the labour force.
6.2.5 Goodness-of-Fit
Upon estimating all these diﬀerent models, it is important to assess to which extent
they can ﬁt the observed sequences mentioned in table 2. Such an exercise is per-
formed by simulating a number of times, sequences of participation based on observed
characteristics in the sample of couples at hand, over draws from the estimated error
distribution of the participation sequence.
I do this for two models. First, the static bivariate model is used and not the
univariate static models since we saw that parameter estimates are the same and that
correlation restrictions were rejected by a likelihood ratio test. The competing model is
the general bivariate dynamic probit since we saw that restrictions from the univariate
dynamic case were similarly rejected and that cross-spouse dependence is statistically
signiﬁcant. Hence, the diﬀerence between the two models arises from the inclusion
of dynamics in participation and in health/insurance dynamics in the dynamic model.
Table 7 reproduces the observed sequences from table 2 for comparison along with the
average simulated frequencies based on 1,000 simulations from the estimated paramet-
ric error distribution. Sequences are grouped by the number of transitions involved to
facilitate interpretation.
20[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The dynamic and static model ﬁt rather well the sequences with no transitions as
both high unobserved heterogeneity in the static case and high state dependence are
ﬂexible enough to accommodate these patterns. Not surprisingly, note however that in
each case (participation and non-participation) the combination between unobserved
heterogeneity and SD in the dynamic model always performs better than the static
model although these estimates are not adjusted for parameter uncertainty.
For sequences involving a single transition towards participation or to non-participation,
things get more diﬃcult to handle for the static model which cannot accommodate the
high unexplained component to participate on one hand with the high unexplained
component once the spouse does not participate. Hence, the SD framework enables to
incorporate such ”bunching” behavior of participation and non-participation far better
except for the 10000 sequence for wives. Furthermore, when looking at more complex
transition patterns it is often striking to see how well the dynamic model ﬁts these
transitions for both husbands and wives and outperforms the static model.
In order to get an informal global assessment of the ﬁt of both models, we can com-
pute the Pearson goodness-of-ﬁt statistic for the observed and predicted frequencies.17
Table 8 reports such statistics for both models and for both husbands and wives.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
Results reported in table 8 show that the equality of predicted and observed se-
quences for the dynamic model cannot be rejected for wives at 5% while it is not
rejected only at the 1% level for husbands. However, this equality is clearly rejected
for the static model. Therefore, this conﬁrms the informal observation made previously
about the ﬁt of both models. It is not however a formal test since it does not account
for parameter uncertainty due to estimation.
7 Conclusion
In reforming the social security system, one cornerstone should be that it can ade-
quately meet the needs of a changing generation of elderly who have much more labour
market experience and therefore stimulate their participation at older age if the ageing
problem threatens public ﬁnance. Since the positive participation trend across cohorts
of women is an important ingredient to successfully cope with the ﬁnancial problems
generated by the ageing problem it is important that these are not impeded by possibly
outdated social security measures which dealt eﬃciently with couples of the preceding
generation but potentially have now adverse eﬀects on the behavior on the current
generation of elderly.







which follows an asymptotic Chi-Square distribution with S ¡ 1 degrees of freedom
if we neglect parameter uncertainty.
21In this respect, this paper tried to identify the complex dynamics of joint labour
force of older couples in the United States using the most up to date source of data on
the behavior of the elderly (HRS) and a ﬂexible reduced-form framework that would
place few restrictions on the richness of those potential dynamics. Moreover, it had
a second objective of looking at the incentive eﬀects of the spouse allowance. A few
key results are worth summarizing and may add to our understanding of joint labour
supply dynamics of older couples.
When accounting for dynamics, it appears that participation of couples is impor-
tantly governed by state-dependence which leads in reality to bunching of participation
and non-participation episodes in adjacent periods. Similar to Blau (1997), pension
accruals appear to have a stronger eﬀect on the wife’s participation decision than on
the husband. Where does this gender diﬀerence come from is still an open question.
Nevertheless, the eﬀects are important enough to induce considerable transitions out
of employment on the 55-60 age segment. Indeed, coupled with the dependence of a
spouse’s decision on the state the other spouse occupied in an adjacent period this
can also have indirect eﬀects for husbands and wives if complementarity in leisure is
present. Hence, the cross-spouse SD results coupled with the correlation in transi-
tory error indicate that there are channelling mechanisms through which these indirect
eﬀects can manifest themselves which was a similar conclusion reached by Blau (1998).
Finally, the spouse allowance is found to have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
participation of the couple as predicted by Blau (1997). However, this study is the ﬁrst
to assess if it is statistically diﬀerent from zero. The participation eﬀects do not cancel
each other and the empirical evidence suggest that the overall eﬀect of the program
on participation of couples is negative. Furthermore, these eﬀects appear to be much
stronger at age 62 for wives and age 64 for husbands which is exactly the average age
diﬀerence for couples in the sample.
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24Appendix A: Likelihood Contribution and GHK Simulator
First step is to look at t > 2: I normalize V ar(´mit) = V ar(´fit) = 1. Then looking
at the serially correlated errors and assuming stationarity, their unconditional variance
and covariance are given by E("2
jit) = ¾2
vj(1 ¡ ½2
j)¡1 and E("mit"fit) = ½v(1 ¡ ½m½f)¡1.
Then this implies that ¾2
®j = 1 ¡ ¾2
vj(1 ¡ ½2
j)¡1 and corresponds to the share of
unobserved heterogeneity in the total variance of the stochastic component ´jit. Note
that if autocorrelation is positive then this share is smaller then if it is assumed to be
zero.





























The initial conditions are added by augmenting this covariance matrix with the free
correlations between period 1 and other periods. This correlation is restricted to be
equal across time periods.
In building up the likelihood we need model the joint probability of the observed se-
quence of choices of the couple hi = (hmi1;hfi1;:::;hmit;hfit::;hmiT;hfiT)0 given the pa-
rameters of the assumed data generating process and the observed characteristics: The




where µ denotes the vector of all parameters to be estimated. The integral in Pr(hijµ)
is a 2T dimensional integral and simulated using the GHK simulator also known as the
smooth conditioning recursive (SRC) simulator.
This maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) which results from replacing proba-
bilities by their simulated counterparts is an inconsistent estimator unless R goes to
inﬁnity. However, it is asymptotically normal and asymptotically equivalent to ML
for R=
p
N ! 1 . I will report results for 50 Halton draws in estimation.18 Standard
errors of the marginal eﬀects are computed from Monte Carlo replications.
18The results were not sensitive to doubling the number of draws.
25Appendix B: Wage Proﬁle Imputation and Social Security
In order to assess the role of social security, wage proﬁles for each spouse in the
household are needed. As a matter of fact, wages are missing for two types of spouses
in the data. A ﬁrst case involves missing wages for workers while a second one involves
missing wages of non-workers. In the ﬁrst case, standard imputation techniques can
be used using the panel data dimensions while in the second case one may have to
assess the non-randomness of the sample of workers in order to use their information
to impute wages for non-workers.
In the second case, the problem is complicated by the fact that the source of sam-
ple selection is not known a priori to come from either correlation in person-speciﬁc
unobservables or from time-speciﬁc unobservables. Hence, I use the two-step estimator
proposed by Vella and Verbeek (1999) to account for both selection processes. One
advantage of this procedure is that a standard Wald Test is available to test for the
presence of sample selection coming from both potential sources. In addition, this
two-step approach allows dynamics in participation to aﬀect the selection process and
allows unknown form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the wage unobserv-
able. I estimate the conditional wage for both spouse separately. From these estimates,
I estimate a ﬁxed eﬀect for each spouse and then use this along with the cross-section
information to impute wages for the two types of missing observations. In fact, this is
a similar procedure to the approach taken by both Blau (1997,1998) and Gustman and
Steinmeier (2000a,2002) with the major diﬀerence that selection is taken into account,
both for unobservables varying in time and constant across time.










it° + Áhi;t¡1 + uit (18)
with the econometrician observing wit = max(w¤
it;0); hit = 1(0;1)(h¤
it). Assume
the two-component error structure eit = ¹i + nit and uit = ai + vit with






E(eitjxit;zit;ui) = ¿1uit + ¿2ui (20)
where ui = T
¡1
t=1
Tuit:This is the case analyzed by Vella and Verbeek (1999) which
allows for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Conditioning on the whole sequence
hi = (hi2;:::;hiT)0 and the initial state hi1 then
E(witjxi;zi;hi1;hi) = x
0
it¯ + E(eitjxit;zit;hi1;hi): (21)
Expanding the second R.H.S. component using (20) yields,
E(eitjxit;zit;hi1;hi) = ¿1E(uitjxit;zit;hi1;hi) + ¿2E(uijxit;zit;hi1;hi) (22)
26Then given consistent parameters estimates of µ = (°1;¼1;°;¾a;Á) from the ﬁrst
step dynamic probit, then Vella and Verbeek show that one can get an unbiased esti-
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hi1;hijxit;zit;e air; b µ
´i
where e air are draws from f(a) given b ¾a and vG
it(e air; b µ) is the generalized residual
of the ﬁrst step binary choice model Then, I estimates (17) by OLS including as
regressors e uit and T
¡1
t=1 e uit as regressors and using only workers who declare wages.
From the coeﬃcient estimates b ¯; I estimates the ﬁxed eﬀects from the observed wages
for each spouse with some wage data. xit is allowed to be quadratic in age, in total
market experience, in tenure on the current job, on industry and census region dummies
and on schooling and race. Time dummies are also included. zit includes the standard
quadratic in age as well as the number of children, capital income and health which
consist the exclusion restrictions. Note that state-dependence acts as an exclusion
restriction also. Results of the second-step are reported in Table B.1
Wage Equation Estimates (Log Hourly Wage)
Parameter estimates
Covariates Male Female
x ¯m se ¯f se
Intercept ¡0:354 1:069 1:550 0:608
Age 0:073 0:038 0:007 0:022
Age2=10 ¡0:007 0:003 ¡0:002 0:002
Tenure 0:026 0:004 0:028 0:004
Tenure2=10 -0:003 ¡0:001 ¡0:005 0:001
Experience 0:014 0:011 0:016 0:005
Experience2=10 ¡0:002 0:002 ¡0:002 0:001
Primary School Years 0:040 0:030 0:006 0:029
High School Years 0:058 0:011 0:044 0:010
College + Years 0:120 0:009 0:112 0:007
¿1 (time spec. selection) 0:190 0:047 0:151 0:037
¿2 (person spec. selection) 0:320 0:052 0:237 0:041
Est. Variance of Fixed E 0:35 0:22
Correlation (b w;w) 0:83 0:85
Census Region, Industry and Time dummies included.
— Table B.1 —
The main component of a spouse’s beneﬁt at age a is the averaged monthly wage
which consist of the 35 highest indexed monthly wage or if fewer years are available
then the ﬁve worst wages are ignored and the remaining ones averaged. A detailed
calculation of the AME requires both the wage proﬁle of the spouse and the distribution
27of wages of other workers as the AME is indexed according to the evolution of the mean
of the distribution. This information is available only in the restricted data set which I
cannot use. Therefore, I resort to using the mean of observed wages as an ”hopefully”
unbiased estimate of the AME.
The AME is used to compute the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). The PIA is a
piece-wise linear function of the AME. Consider t as the time of retirement. The 1995
function was
PIAt = c1 min[AMEt;p1] + c2 min[max[AMEt ¡ p1;0];p2 ¡ p1] (23)
+c3 max[AMEt ¡ p1 ¡ p2;0]:
where p1 = $426 and p2 = $2567, referred to as bendpoints, and (c1;c2;c3) =
(0:4;0:32;0:15) in 1995. Once the PIA is computed, some adjustments are made for
the age at which beneﬁts are taken. Refer to at as a spouse’s age at period t. This
yields the spouse’s own entitlement bt given by
bt = 1[62;1)(at)exp(gDRCyDRC ¡ gARFyARF)PIAt (24)
where yDRC is the number of years at t since the spouse turned 65 up to a maximum
of 5 if the Normal Retirement Age is 65 and yARF is the number of years at t before
the individual reaches 65 if he/she is older than or 62. gDRC is the yearly rate at which
beneﬁts are increased for delayed retirement (Delayed Retirement Credit) and gARF is
the actuarial reduction factor which decreases beneﬁts to reﬂect increased. These along
with the normal retirement age have been changed as a result of the 1983 amendments
and depend on the birth year of the spouse. The adjustment where made according to
the information published in the Handbook of Social Security, Chapter 7.
28Table 1 Transition of Spouses
State at (t-1)
Husbands Wives
Year State N L N L
1994 N 84.7 13.3 87.9 13.0
L 15.3 86.7 12.1 87.0
1996 N 85.7 14.6 89.6 17.8
L 14.3 85.4 10.4 82.2
1998 N 89.4 16.7 88.9 18.4
L 10.6 83.3 11.1 81.6
2000 N 91.4 20.3 92.4 19.6
L 8.6 79.7 7.6 80.4
Conditional Prob of leaving state at t
N = non-participation, L = participation.
29Table 2. Participation Sequences HRS 1992-2000
Sequences Husb. Wives Sequences Husb. Wives
No Trans. 3-Trans.
11111 1170 942 00101 3 3
00000 501 800 10010 11 5
1671 1742 11010 24 27
1-Trans. 10100 22 10
∆¡ LFP 01011 2 5
11110 261 187 01101 4 3
11100 200 171 01001 2 4
11000 192 177 10110 17 7
10000 182 161 85 64
835 696 4-Trans.
∆+ LFP 10101 6 5
01111 45 53 01010 2 6


















30Table 3 Dependence in Transitions
State at (t)
State Husbands Wives
of Other Spouse (t-1) N L N L
1994 N 39.0 61.0 55.9 44.1
L 24.0 76.0 35.6 64.4
∆(Pr) 15.0 ∆(Pr) 20.3
1996 N 46.4 53.6 63.0 37.0
L 28.2 71.8 39.8 60.2
∆(Pr) 18.2 ∆(Pr) 23.2
1998 N 54.2 45.8 65.3 34.7
L 32.3 67.7 43.5 56.5
∆(Pr) 21.9 ∆(Pr) 21.8
2000 N 61.0 39.5 70.9 29.1
L 39.5 60.5 46.6 53.4
∆(Pr) 21.0 ∆(Pr) 24.3
Cells: Conditional Prob of leaving state at t
Table 4 Joint Transitions of Couples
State at (t-1)
State at t LL LN NL NN
LL 74.8 11.2 12.6 1.7
LN 11.3 69.3 2.1 7.8
NL 10.0 1.6 64.5 5.2
NN 3.9 18.0 20.8 85.3
Cells: % of Column Frequencies
31Table 6 Marginal Eﬀect Estimates
Estimates: (1,1) state at ( t ¡ 1)
Husband Wife
Covariates Mean Dynamic Static Mean Dynamic Static
Age 61.6 -0.016 -0.035 57.7 -0.010 -0.019
ADL index (t) 0.15 -0.049 -0.056 0.15 -0.062 -0.054
ADL index (t ¡ 1) - -0.005 - - -0.018 -
Pension ac. 55-60 0.65 0.018 0.047 0.67 0.069 0.196
Pension ac. 60-65 0.19 -0.008 0.007 0.34 0.033 0.074
Health index (m;t) 2.61 -0.032 -0.038 2.61 0.010 0.007
Health index (m;t ¡ 1) 2.53 -0.018 - 2.53 -0.001 -
Health index (f;t) 2.53 0.006 0.003 2.53 -0.025 -0.027
Health index (f;t ¡ 1) 2.46 0.001 - 2.46 -0.014 -
Age diﬀerence (m ¡ f) 1.73 0.002 0.005 1.73 -0.003 -0.006
Spouse A. (on m0s acc.) 0.09 0.156 0.020 0.09 -0.362 -0.377
Spouse A. (on f0s acc.) 0.10 -0.381 0.122 0.10 0.092 -0.117
Participation Prob (.)
(hmt¡1;hft¡1) = (1;1) 0.836 0.588 0.814 0.508
(hmt¡1;hft¡1) = (1;0) 0.772 - 0.178 -
(hmt¡1;hft¡1) = (0;1) 0.213 - 0.731 -




Cross-SD (wife for husb. LFP) 0.064¤
Cross-SD (husb. for wife LFP) 0.083
Notes: 10,000 Monte Carlo replications are used using table 5 estimates
to compute standard errors. Evaluated at average characteristics.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 7 Predicted and Observed Participation Sequences
Husbands Wives
Sequences Obs. B.Dyn Static Obs. B.Dyn Static
No transitions
11111 1170 1170.3 1147.8 942 947.8 914.1
00000 501 456.3 453.4 800 748.6 742.3
1-Transition
∆¡ LFP
11110 261 253.2 236.9 187 190.7 160.5
11100 200 212.8 141.6 171 172.6 105.5
11000 192 209.0 122.4 177 190.7 90.9
10000 182 185.1 154.8 161 175.7 162.3
∆+ LFP
01111 45 35.5 7.9 53 48.8 16.9
00111 18 23.6 2.1 32 37.8 4.7
00011 5 14.3 2.0 23 26.5 3.7
00001 12 18.0 6.7 18 34.6 15.7
2-Transitions
11101 55 58.2 113.4 50 46.8 94.9
11011 46 40.3 50.1 49 34.9 51.3
10111 43 32.2 19.9 29 29.2 26.7
10011 12 10.4 7.1 14 10.0 10.6
11001 17 19.6 34.4 20 16.5 32.0
10001 8 11.3 13.1 11 13.1 19.3
01000 16 24.2 77.8 23 32.9 91.0
00100 10 21.5 33.8 23 29.9 50.6
00010 8 15.8 15.6 22 25.2 27.8
01100 15 13.2 30.3 22 13.4 32.2
00110 4 10.7 8.3 13 13.2 11.2
01110 15 13.3 14.3 13 14.9 17.3
347 (continued) Husbands Wives
Obs B.dyn. Static Obs B.dyn Static
3-Transitions
00101 3 2.9 2.6 3 5.0 7.1
10010 11 9.0 28.9 5 7.3 31.3
11010 24 24.2 64.8 27 19.2 55.9
10100 22 19.8 55.3 10 16.9 57.7
01011 2 2.4 3.5 5 4.0 7.0
01101 4 2.3 8.9 3 3.0 11.3
01001 2 1.6 7.0 4 2.3 10.3
10110 17 11.0 33.2 7 8.3 28.6
4-Transitions
10101 6 3.6 17.2 5 3.7 17.9
01010 2 2.5 12.9 6 3.4 19.4
1000 Monte Carlo replications used and freq averaged.
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Figure 1: Comparisons of Transitions Rates with and without Cross State-dependence.
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Figure 2: Simulated Eﬀect of the Elimination of the Spouse Allowance
37